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Afghan civilians are much more tolerant of harm from the
Taliban than they are from ISAF.
As the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan continues in 2014, many are now
concerned about the attitudes of local civilians towards the Taliban compared with the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair and Kosuke Imai
have conducted research on the ground in Afghanistan which aims to measure how civilian
attitudes are effected by violence from both groups. They find that ISAF victimization is
associated with a large increase in support for the Taliban, but that harm by the Taliban only
leads to a modest drop in support.They also find however, that small, targeted assistance
programs among those harmed by ISAF can help to reverse much of the outflow of support to the
Taliban.
The arrival of 2014 promises to open the flood gates of prognostication about Afghanistan’s future
as the long-planned withdrawal of US and NATO forces nears completion. Much stock has been
placed in discerning Afghan attitudes toward their government and the Taliban as clues for
anticipating future events. And with good reason. Counterinsurgency theorists (well, most of
them) have argued that winning “hearts and minds” is a key, if not the key, to victory—or at least
what passes for victory in these settings.
Yet the deeper question—just how do we measure “hearts and minds” accurately?—is often lost
in the revolving shuffle of Powerpoint decks and (endless) debates about metrics. Clearly the
obstacles are formidable. Dumping billions of dollars into a country is likely to skew attitudes, if
only because it generates incentives for recipients to shade their answers in ways that guarantee
future assistance. The shadow of violence also looms over respondents and enumerators alike:
speaking honestly, or simply entering a village to solicit opinions, can be risky endeavors.
In 2010-11, we took a stab at
measuring Afghan attitudes
toward the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the
Taliban using an indirect survey
method (“endorsement
experiments”) designed to
minimize these issues. We were
particularly interested in figuring
out how support for ISAF and the
Taliban were (not) affected by
violence. What happened to
support for ISAF once an
individual (or his family) was
harmed by ISAF? Did the same
hold true for the Taliban, or did
Taliban violence mean something
different to its victims?
Very briefly, we surveyed nearly
3,000 Afghan males in 204
villages in 5 predominantly Pashtun provinces. We posed a series of questions about an individual’s exposure to
violence by both sides. We then used four indirect questions which we pooled together to measure support for
each combatant.
The mechanics of a survey endorsement experiment are straightforward. Randomly selected respondents are
assigned to a treatment group and asked to express their opinion toward a policy endorsed by a specific actor
whose support level we wish to measure (here, ISAF and the Taliban).
These responses are then contrasted with those from a control group of respondents that answered an identical
question without the endorsement. Higher levels of enthusiasm for a policy with an endorsement relative to those
without it are viewed as evidence of support for the endorsing actor. Since each respondent is assigned only one
condition for any endorsement experiment, it is impossible for enumerators or others to compare support levels
across different conditions for any individual respondent.
What do we find? Put simply, the effects of combatant violence on civilian attitudes are highly asymmetric. Harm
by ISAF, as outlined in Figure 1 below, is associated with a sharp decrease in support for ISAF (column 1, left
side) and a marked increase in support for the Taliban (column 2, left side). Harm by the Taliban, however, is
associated with almost no transfer of support to ISAF (column 1, right side) and has only a very modest negative
effect on support for the Taliban (column 2, right side).
Figure 1 – Support for ISAF and Taliban and harm
The final panel in the figure drives this point home: ISAF victimization is associated with a large increase in
support for the Taliban; harm by the Taliban, only a modest downturn in support for the Taliban. While it would be
inaccurate to conclude that the Taliban can harm civilians without repercussions, it is apparent that they enjoy (if
that is the right word) far more latitude than ISAF. 
These findings carry several implications for understanding the dynamics of violence in Afghanistan today. Hoping
that Afghans will turn away from the Taliban in disgust at civilian casualties, for example, is unlikely to be a viable
strategy, at least among Taliban supporters. According to UNAMA’s data, the Taliban have been responsible for at
least 80 percent of civilian casualties since 2008. Yet this victimization is unlikely to have the same meaning, or
political impact, as (much rarer) ISAF civilian casualties.
Abandoning efforts to influence attitudes would be equally mistaken, however. We found suggestive evidence, for
example, that small, targeted assistance programs among those harmed by ISAF managed to reverse much,
though not all, of the outflow of support to the Taliban. Moreover, evidence points to attitudes as an
important predictor of future insurgent attacks, suggesting a link between attitudes and (future) behavior that
should not be ignored.
That, in turn, requires bringing increasingly sophisticated methods to bear to measure attitudes in violent settings.
Glamorous stuff, no. But if we can’t even measure “hearts and minds,” why would we ever believe that we could
“win” them?
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